Sefer HaChinuch ספר החינוך

That a relative not testify, one about the other: That we have been commanded not to accept the testimony of some relatives about some relatives. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 24:16), “Parents shall not be put to death for children, nor children be put to death for parents” — and concerning this came the traditional understanding (Sanhedrin 27b) [that it means that] fathers should not be put to death from the testimony of the sons, and sons should not be put to death from the testimony of the fathers. And the same is true of financial cases — that we do not believe some relatives about some relatives. However it is mentioned regarding laws [involving] death sentences by way of hyperbole — that we should not say, since this is [causing] the loss of life, we should not suspect the relative about him, but rather do like his testimony; since his testimony is to lose the life of his relative. And even though the verse only mentioned the fathers and the sons, the same is true of several of the other relatives. But it mentioned sons and fathers by way of an example; saying that [even though] one loves the other very much, and [yet the Torah] stated that also these are not believed that one should condemn the other and — there is no need to say — exonerate [him]. And the same is true of some of the [other] relatives, as the tradition about them has come to us — and we shall mention them in the laws of the commandment, with God’s help.

It is from the roots of this commandment [that] since the essence of all human matters is dependent upon testimony of people — like the matter that I wrote at the beginning of my book — therefore, the Omnipresent wanted to distance [us from] making [improper] judgment among people; [and] only [to make it] with strong and true testimony that is clean from any suspicion. And to strengthen the matter, He distanced us from all the testimony of relatives — even to condemn; lest the habit spread with this to accept him also to exonerate. And this matter is from the ways of the perfect Torah to always distance us from snares and things that are close [to them]; that damage be found from them to people. And there is another benefit found from the matter [and that is that] since relatives always dwell one near the other, their dwelling and being together [makes it] impossible for them to be saved from sometimes quarreling, one with the other. And if we would believe their testimony — one against the other — perhaps in their constant anger [of] one against the other, their anger would momentarily rise and they would come in front of the court and condemn their heads to the king. And once his anger abates, the relative will almost strangle himself from worry about his relative and about his [own] deeds. And all the ways of God are straight.

And from the laws of this commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (see Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:1) that the disqualification of being related from Torah writ is only with the family of the father — and they are the father with the son and with the son of the son; and the brothers from the father with each other, and their sons with one another; and there is no need to say, the uncle with the son of his brother. But with the other relatives from the mother, and so [too] the relatives from the side of marriage, their disqualification is [only] rabbinic. And this reasoning is taught in the last mishnah in the chapter [entitled] Zeh Borer (Mishnah Sanhedrin 3:4), which is all the extant law, according to the opinion of a few commentators. But from [the commentators], there are [other] great ones — sages and wise ones — that decided [that] even all of the sibling relatives from the mother, and so [too] his brother-in-law and stepson and all that are not fit to inherit, are [all] disqualified from Torah writ, [just] like the [corresponding] relative on the father’s side — as they learned [to include] them in the Gemara, from the inclusion of the verse, [based on its mentioning] “fathers, fathers” twice. And their proofs are in their books — merit, my son and you will distinguish the truth.

And (see Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:3-5) the brothers with each other were called by the Sages, the first (level of separation) with the first; and so the father with his son is also called like this, the first with the first. And the children of the brothers with each other are called the second with the second; and the sons of the sons of the brothers are called the third with the third. And it is established for us that a third with a first is [a] proper [witness], and, all the more so, a third with a second — and it is not necessary to say that a third with a third is proper. But a second with a second is disqualified — and it is not necessary to say that a second with a first is disqualified. And according to this, the father is disqualified with his son and with his son’s son; but he is proper with the son of his son’s son — as he is a third with a first. But there are a few commentators (Rashbam on Bava Batra 128a:18), the opinion of which is to say that all those that come from the “thigh” of a person are disqualified for him. And the brother with his sister are likewise called a first with a first, like with brothers. And in the same way that we count with males, the first generation and the second and the third, so [too] is it counted with the females. (See Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:6.)

And so [too] is this matter with what they, may their memory be blessed said (see Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:6) that anyone who is disqualified with [a specific related] woman, is [also] disqualified with her husband, since the husband is like one body with his wife in this matter. And so too, we say that anyone who is disqualified to testify about the husband is likewise disqualified from testifying about his wife; as the husband is like his wife, and the wife is like her husband. And we say “a husband is like his wife” once, but we do not say “a husband is like his wife” twice [over]. For example (as a result), the son-in-law of his brother-in-law (the brother of his wife’s sister) is proper to testify for him, as it is his brother-in-law who is disqualified to him because of his wife’s sister — who is a sexual prohibition for him. But the son-in-law of his brother-in-law is not disqualified to him, because he is married to the daughter of the sister of his wife, who is disqualified to him — since “a husband is like his wife” about this matter is not said twice [over]. But any time that both of the women are sexual prohibitions to him, we do say “a husband is like his wife” twice [over]. For example, two men that are married to two sisters are disqualified from each other, as both of them [together] are sexual prohibitions for both of them; and so [too], the husband of his stepdaughter, as both [together] are sexually forbidden to him; as behold, they are “a woman and her daughter,” and so [too] anything similar to this. This is what comes out of the Gemara, according to what my teachers have taught me — God should guard them with the good explanations.

And they said about this matter in Ketuvot 28a that relatives are [accepted] to testify when he is an adult, about the writing of his father or his teacher or his brother that he saw when he was a minor. And the disqualification of being a relative is with the laws [involving] death penalties and with financial cases — whether the witnesses are relatives of the litigant or the guarantor or to each other or to the [judges of the] court or the court [is related] to the litigant or the court is related to each other.

Regarding the matter of one who was a relative and became distant (no longer a relative), we hold that he is proper (Sanhedrin 28b); and even if there are sons there — as the law is not like Rabbi Yehudah, who holds that if there are sons there, he is disqualified.

Brothers on the mother’s side [only,] can testify for one another. (See Mishneh Torah, Testimony 13:12-14.) As behold, there is no relation between them at all — except that the brother of this one is [also] the brother of that one, and that is not considered a relation. And a man and his wife are a first with a first. Therefore a husband cannot testify for her son and not for the wife of her son, and not for her daughter and not for the husband of her daughter and not for the wife of her brother. And regarding this matter, when he is engaged to his wife, she herself is disqualified, but her relatives are not, until he marries her. And, as a general rule, our teachers, may God protect them, taught us concerning the matter of testimony that anyone who knows testimony for his fellow and was originally proper — meaning to say he was not disqualified to him — and became disqualified to him in between, and then returned to being proper — for example, that he became distant — is proper to testify for him. [This is the case] even though he became disqualified in between. But if he was disqualified originally — even though he became proper in the end — he is disqualified. And it is not necessary to say that one who was originally proper and became disqualified in the end is disqualified; as he is disqualified at the time of the testimony. And the rest of the details of this commandment are elucidated in the third chapter of Tractate Sanhedrin.

And this commandment is practiced, with regards to financial cases that are observed today, in every place and at all times by males, as it is upon them to receive testimony — since they are the ones that judge, and not females. And one who transgresses this, and accepts the testimony of a relative that is not fitting to testify and judges according to his testimony, has violated this negative commandment. But we do not give lashes for it, since there is no act [involved] with it.