Sefer HaChinuch ספר החינוך

To not establish a matter of testimony with one witness: That we have been prevented from establishing the parameters of a punishment upon the body of the convicted — and likewise that we not extract money — according to the testimony of one witness; and even if he is the most fit and wise, or even if he is a prophet. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 19:15), “One witness shall not rise against a man for any iniquity or for any sin.”

It is from the roots of the commandment [that it is] since the impulse of a man’s heart is evil, and sometimes a passion comes to his heart against his fellow; and even if he is an extremely proper man, he is not saved from sometimes sinning. And even if a man stands for [a very long time] upon the ways of righteousness, it is not impossible for him to overturn his thoughts and to become bad. As behold, they, may their memory be blessed, said (Berakhot 29a) that Yochanan served in the high priesthood and at the end [of his long tenure], he turned into a Saducee; [they also said about him that he was at first a true prophet, and at the end, he became a false prophet]. Hence the thing is fit to not rely upon the heart of a man to punish his fellow according to his testimony; and even if the convicted is a total evildoer and the most common of commoners and the one testifying is the greatest sage in Israel. But when those testifying are two fit men, there is an assumption about all of the seed of Israel that they will not agree to testify falsely. And [this type of] an assumption is [powerful] about all things.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Shevuot 40a) about one witness, “‘For any iniquity or for any sin’ — that is when he does not rise” — meaning to say that we do not punish any person according to one witness, monetarily or corporeally; that is the understanding of “iniquity or sin.” “But he does rise for an oath” — meaning to say that he obligates an oath for the one that he testifies about. For example, if a man said to his fellow, “Give me the hundred that I lent you,” [and the other answers,] “I don’t have anything [of yours] in my hand,” and one witness testifies like the words of the claimant, the defendant is obligated to take an oath. And also that which they said that even though the Torah did not give believability to one witness to punish his fellow monetarily or corporeally according to him; nonetheless he is believed for prohibitions — and like they said in many places (Gittin 2b), “One witness is believed with prohibitions.” [This is] meaning to say, [if] he testifies, “This meat” or “this wine, is forbidden” or “is fit (kosher),” he is believed. And so too [is it regarding] all that is similar to this, with all of the prohibitions of the Torah. And [also that] which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Makkot 6b) that with monetary cases, we accept individual testimony. How is that? One says, “He borrowed in front of me,” and one said, “He admitted it in front of me” — they are combined. And [also] that which they, may their memory be blessed, said that if one testified in this court and one testified in a different court, one court comes to the other court and they combine their testimonies. And [it is] like we say at the beginning of the chapter [entitled] Get Pashut (Bava Batra 165b), “His colleagues sent to Rabbi Yirmeyah, ‘One witness in writing, and one witness orally, what is the law whether they can combine? Two who testified, one in this court and one in another court, what is the law whether one court could come to the other court and combine? Two witnesses who testified in this court and went back and testified in that court, what is the law whether one [of the judges] of each court could combine [with each other to testify as two witnesses]?’ He sent [back] to them, ‘I am not worthy that you [should have] sent to me. But the opinion of your student leans to them combining.’” And [also] that which they said in Ketuvot 21a in the chapter [entitled] Eeshah Shenitalminah, that a witness and a judge do not combine in that which is from Torah writ.

And that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 5:2) that the Torah believed one witness in two places: with a suspected adulteress (sotah), that she not drink the bitter waters; and with a beheaded calf, that it should not be beheaded — meaning to say, if one testifies that he knows about the killing of the one murdered, we do not behead the calf; as the Torah stated (Deuteronomy 21:1), “not known,” but behold, it is known to one man. And the Sages believed one witness that testifies for a woman that her husband has died, so that she not be anchored (become an agunah that is not allowed to remarry). And they, may their memory be blessed, said as the reason for this that she is very exacting after the truth in this. As if she might perhaps marry [as a result] and her [first] husband come afterwards, she must exit from [both marriages], and the offspring [from the second] is a mamzer. And [also that which] they, may their memory be blessed, said (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Testimony 5:3) that in every place that the testimony of one witness is effective, the testimony of a woman or someone disqualified is also effective; except for the one witness of an oath, as we only obligate an oath with the testimony of one fit witness.

And so [too,] that which they said that sometimes the defendant pays money according to one witness. How is that? (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Plaintiff and Defendant 4:8) One who says to his friend, “It is my hundred in your hand” — and a witness testifies about it; and the defendant says, “That is correct, but you owe me a hundred corresponding to that hundred.” Behold, he is obligated an oath because of the testimony of the witness, but he cannot make an oath to contradict the witness, as he concedes to that which the witness testified. And the law is such that anyone who is obligated an oath to his fellow and is not able to make the oath must pay; and we do not ever administer oaths from the testimony of one witness unless the one taking the oath is contradicting the witness, denies his testimony and makes an oath about it. And on account of that reason, Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Plaintiff and Defendant 4:8) that [in the case of] a promissory note that has one witness upon it and the defendant claims that he paid it, [since] he is not now contradicting the testimony of the witness that is testifying about the loan, he must pay. And others (see Raavad there) disagree with him. And so [too,] one who denies [having taken the loan] that has one witness come against him and [then] claimed that he paid or returned the deposit — in all of these [cases], we say that [since] he is obligated an oath and he cannot make the oath, he must pay. And in the Gemara in Bava Batra 33b-34a, in the chapter [entitled] Chezkat HaBatim, “There is a story about one who seized a bar of silver from his fellow in front of one witness, and he said, ‘That is correct that I seized it from him, but I seized what was mine.’ And [the case] came in front of Rav Dimi and he said, ‘How should the judges judge this case? To pay [is not possible, as] there are not two witnesses; to exempt [is not possible, as] there is one witness; to have him take an oath that he did not seize it [is not possible, as] behold, he concedes and says, “Yes, I seized it.”’ And Rabbi Abba was sitting in front of him and said, ‘He is liable for an oath’” — meaning to say, because of the words of the witness — “‘but he is not able to make the oath, as behold he is not contradicting the words of the witness. And anyone who is obligated an oath and cannot make the oath must pay.’” And this is the law in all that is similar to this.

And one who claimed against his fellow, “I lent you a hundred,” and he denied it and said to him, “You never lent me anything ever,” and [the claimant] brought a witness in front of him that he had borrowed from him: Since if there had been two [witnesses], he would have been considered a denier and his verdict would have been to pay, behold this one must swear on account of the one witness — since in every place that two obligate him for money, one obligates him in an oath. [If] he came back and said, “I paid it,” he must pay without an oath — as he is obligated in a oath on account of the testimony of the one witness, but he is not able to make the oath; as behold he is not contradicting him in the testimony of the loan, but rather he is saying, “I paid.” And we have already said that anyone who is obligated an oath that he cannot make must pay. [These] and the rest of the many details of the commandment are elucidated in scattered places in Yevamot, in Ketuvot, in Sotah, in Gittin, in Kiddushin and in all of the Order of Nezikin.

And this commandment is practiced regarding the matter of monetary cases that are practiced today in every place and at all times by males, since it is for them to administer justice. And one who transgresses this and establishes the parameters of the punishment, except for in the ways that we explained — whether corporeal or monetary — with one witness has violated this negative commandment.