Sefer HaChinuch ספר החינוך

To not vitiate justice: That the judge not cause vitiation in a decision. And vitiation is with anything where he deviates from that which the Torah commanded us regarding the law, unless he did so with the consent of the litigants. And about this is it stated (Leviticus 19:15), “You shall not vitiate judgment.”

The root of this commandment is well-known, since the civilization of men is preserved with righteous judgment.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Ketuvot 105a) that one who [unnecessarily] prolongs the judgment is included in one vitiating judgment. And that which they said (Mishnah Avot 1:1), “Be deliberate in judgment,” so that they not come to vitiation of the judgment. And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Yevamot 109b) that it is fitting for someone judging to consult with someone greater than he, if he is near him. And they said in warning about this matter (Mishnah Avot 4:7), “Anyone who prevents himself from judging — prevents from himself enmity, theft and the false oath.” And all of this is to teach us that the thing requires deliberation and much composure, so that they not err in the decision. As there are many things [involved] in legal decisions, and one must be a great sage in a decision — and it is like they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Batra 175b), “One who wants to become wise should engage in monetary laws, as there is no greater discipline in the Torah than them, as they are like a flowing spring.” And they also warned us that the judgment of a small coin should be beloved to us like the judgment of a thousand expensive coins, to judge it according to its truth. And because of the weightiness of judgment, they greatly praised the one who can bring a compromise between the litigants. And about him is it said (Zechariah 8:16), “truth and peaceful justice shall you rule” — as this is the judgment of peace. And so too about David does it state (II Samuel 8:15), “and David executed judgment and righteousness (tsedakah, which is also the word for charity) for all of his people” — which is the judgment that also has charity? One can say, a settlement. And the rest of the many warnings that they, may their memory be blessed, warned us about equitability in judgment and the rest of the details of the commandment are scattered in the Order of Nezikin, and are primarily in Tractate Sanhedrin. (See Tur, Choshen Mishpat 17.)

And it is practiced in every place and at all times by males, since judgment is for them. And one who transgresses it and vitiates a judgment — meaning to say, he consciously judges not like the law of the Torah — has violated this negative commandment. But we do not administer lashes for it, as we do not administer lashes for a negative commandment that does not have an act [involved] with it, but rather only speech — except for those that we mentioned above (Sefer HaChinukh 239). And also behold, anyone who judges not according to the law of the Torah, his decision is overturned; and hence we do not administer lashes for it. And [it is] as we say in Sanhedrin 33a in the chapter [entitled] Echad Dinei Mammonot, that anyone who errs in the matter of Mishnah is always overturned. And the matter is to say that there is no doubt that the judgment of anyone who errs to make a judgment which is the opposite of the Torah’s intent is completely negated — and behold, it is as if it was never said. And there, it is elucidated that there are situations in which if he judged a case opposite to the truth, his decision [stands]; but he is obligated to pay from his estate to the one to whom he vitiated the judgment. And [even] with all this, he does not become liable for lashes — and even if he did an act with it, such as giving and taking [property in question] with [his own] hand — due to the rule that is in our hands, that we do not administer lashes for anything that is given to repayment.

And if it were not that the matter would be [so] long and we would leave the bounds of our work, we would explain at length all of the situations wherein the decision is overturned and the situations when it is not overturned but the court is liable to pay from its estate, and the situations wherein it is not overturned and the court is exempted from paying. And it appears from the general rule of the matter that anytime that they judged without acceptance [beforehand by the litigants] and there is a greater [authority] in the city than them and they erred — even in [their] course of thought — their judgment is overturned. And that is when they did not give and take by hand; for if they did give and take by hand, their decision is not overturned, but they are obligated to pay. [If it is] in a different way, their decision is not overturned. And when they judged by permission, whereby it cannot be said that they were negligent when they came to judge, they are exempted from paying. But when it was without permission — or also in any situation that one can say that they were negligent at all when they come to judge — they are obligated to pay. And in all that they said that the decision is overturned, they are exempted from paying even if the thing that they decided upon was lost or consumed, unless they actually gave and took by hand — since they are [then] nonetheless liable to pay from the law of damagers. Behold, if it is not like this, they are exempt. And my teacher — God should protect him — explained to us, that that which we said above that anyone who errs in the matter of Mishnah is always overturned, is not literally only the Mishnah, but rather anything explicit in the Talmud in the words of the Amoraim (Rabbis of the Talmudic era) as the law; if he erred in judgment about it, it is also called erring in the matter of a Mishnah. And they further expanded their ways by also saying that even one who errs in a decision that was decided by one of the Geonim or from the sages famous among us for their wisdom — we treat it like one who erred in the matter of a Mishnah. [That is the case] unless that court says that it is not deciding like him and will not defer from judging its decisions like its opinion on account of him and that it knows and remembers the opinion of that Gaon or sage — and that is when it is fit for it [to do so].